Osgoode Hall Law School of York University

Osgoode Digital Commons
Articles & Book Chapters

Faculty Scholarship

2007

Who Needs Paper Anymore? Rationalizing an Allocation of
Government Responsibility for the Transfer of Securities
Poonam Puri
Osgoode Hall Law School of York University, ppuri@osgoode.yorku.ca

Gil Lan

Source Publication:
Banking and Finance Law Review. Volume 23 (2007), p. 1-49.

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/scholarly_works

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative
Works 4.0 License.
Recommended Citation
Puri, Poonam, and Gil Lan. "Who Needs Paper Anymore? Rationalizing an Allocation of Government
Responsibility for the Transfer of Securities." Banking and Finance Law Review 23 (2007): 1-49.

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Osgoode Digital Commons. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Articles & Book Chapters by an authorized administrator of Osgoode Digital
Commons.

Who Needs Paper Anymore?: Rationalizing an Allocation of Government Responsib...
Poonam Puri; Gil Lan
Banking & Finance Law Review; Oct 2007; 23, 1; ABI/INFORM Global
pg. 1

Who Needs Paper Anymore?: Rationalizing an
Allocation of Government Responsibility for the
Transfer of Securities
Poonam Puri* & Gil Lan**
Canadian federal corporate legislation contemplates that shares will be transferred by
endorsement of paper share certificates. These provisions, now found in the Canada
Business Corporations Act (CBCA) Part VII, were enacted in the mid-1970s to reflect
the then current market practices. However.for the last two decades, the overwhelmingly
prevalent commercial practice is to transfer shares by book entries without using paper
certificates (such transfers taking place in what is called the "indirect holding system").
It is embarrassing to note that, despite the domination of the indirect holding system,
until recently there have been no legislative provisions addressing this method oftransferring securities.
Recent specific provincial legislation has addressed this practice by removing responsibilityfor securities transfersfrom provincial corporate legislation and placing it within
legislation that deals exclusively with securities transfers. However, Canadian federal
legislation has yet to respond to the ubiquitous indirect holding system for federal
corporations. This article reviews the case law history regarding the current CBCA
Part VII provisions and outlines the current prevailing methods of transferring securities. It then compares the operation ofCBCA Part VII to general corporate law policy
rationales. The impact of provincial securities legislations on the CBCA is evaluated
and the fu.ture role ofthe CBCA Part VII provisions is analyzed by focusing on efficiency
concerns. Finally, responses by the Canadian federal government are evaluated and
two possible solutions are offered as rational and efficient responses under the current
circumstances.

Les Lois federates canadiennes sur Les societes prevoient que les actions sont transferees
par l'endossement de certificats d'actions papiers. Ces dispositions, qui figurent
maintenant dans la Loi canadienne sur les societes par actions ( LCSA). ont ete adoptees
dans le milieu des annees 1970 afin de rejleter les pratiques du marche alors en vigueur.
Toutefois, au cours des deux demieres decennies, la pratique commerciale predominante
est de ne plus utiliser de certificats papiers, mais plut6t de transferer les actions au
moyen d'inscriptions en compte aupres d'intermediaires en valeurs mobilieres (le
« systeme de detention indirect » ). 11 est genant de noter qu 'en depit de la predominance
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du systeme de detention indirect, ii n'y a eu, jusqu'a recemment. aucune disposition
legislative traitant de ce mode de transfert des valeurs mobilieres.
Une loi provinciale recente traite de cette pratique a l'interieur non pas d'une loi sur
les societes mais dans une legislation portant exclusivement sur le transfert de valeurs
mobilieres. IA legislation federale canadienne se doit de repondre au systeme de
detention indirect, egalement omnipresent au sein des socit!tes f ederales. Le present
article examine la jurisprudence concemant les dispositions actuelles de la Partie VII
de la LCSA et fail ressortir les modes de transfert de valeurs mobilieres qui prevalent
actuellement. JI compare ensuite le fonctionnement de la Partie VII de la LCSA par
rapport aux fondements des pratiques regissant le droit des societes en general.
L'incidence des Lois sur les valeurs mobilieres provinciales sur la LCSA fail l'objet
d'une evaluation par Les auteurs et le role eventuel des dispositions de la Partie VII de
la LCSA est analyse en mettant /'accent sur les questions d'efficience. Finalement, les
reactions du gouvernement federal canadien sont evaluees et deux pistes de solution
sont explorees relativement a ces reactions.

1. INTRODUCTION
The objectives of this article are threefold. First, it undertakes a
brief historical overview of the present Canada Business Corporations
Act (CBCA) Part VII provisions (enacted in the mid 1970s), including
an overview of how the present provisions operate to create negotiable
corporate securities as well as a summary of the case law decided under
CBCA Part VII. Second, it analyzes the policy rationale of CBCA Part
VII and compares this to both current security transfer practices as well
as the latest provincial legislative initiatives regarding securities transfer.
Based upon this, there is a critical analysis of CBCA Part VII in light of
the CBCA policy rationales and the impact of provincial securities transfer legislation. From the critical analysis, the article suggests the role of
CBCA Part VII for the future. Third, based upon the foregoing discussions, the article then makes recommendations regarding how the federal
government might approach CBCA Part VII given some of the procedural obstacles and practical concerns that exist.
This article proceeds as follows. Part 2 reviews the history of the
present CBCA Part VII provisions in light of the market practices at the
time of their enactment and notes the particular influence that American
legislative action had on the process. This part offers an overview of the
provisions of CBCA Part VII with particular emphasis on how the
negotiability provisions function to enhance the free flow of corporate
securities. The case law relating to CBCA Part VII is reviewed and
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analyzed and case law under Ontario's corporate statute is briefly com-

pared.
Part 3 examines the policy rationale behind CBCA Part VII and
proposes a bifurcated model whereby CBCA Part VII addresses two
distinct sets of policy rationales of (a) supportive and administrative
functions, and (b) market supporting and efficiency functions. In this
part of the article, CBCA Part VII is also evaluated in light of current
market practices relating to securities transfer. In particular, the prevailing indirect holding system is a focus of the article. Current provincial legislative initiatives regarding securities transfer are explored with
a view to how they interact with CBCA Part VII. Finally, Part 3 conducts
a critical analysis of CBCA Part VII as it relates to (a) the CBCA's
policy rationales, and (b) the impact of provincial legislative initiatives.
Part 3 also suggests a future role for CBCA Part Vil
Part 4 draws upon the analysis in Part 3 and reviews the various
factors that facilitate or hinder changes to the CBCA. Based upon this,
as well as an analysis of provincial initiatives, four possible options for
amending the CBCA are presented. Of these four options, two are suggested as being optimal solutions for the CBCA. Part 5 concludes.

2. CBCA PART VII PROVISIONS - BRIEF HISTORY,
SUMMARY OVERVIEW AND CASE LAW
(a)

Brief History

The current CBCA Part VII provisions relate to the topic of security
certificates, registers and transfers. These provisions were originally
enacted in the mid-1970s 1 and were intended to bring the CBCA into
line with the then current market practices.
Prior to the current CBCA Part VII provisions, the share certificate
itself was only a representation of what was written in the corporation's
shareholder register. The definitive source of shareholder rights was the
actual shareholder register and supporting documentation (usually contained in the corporation minute book and consisting of documents such
1

These provisions were introduced in the Canada Corporations Act, R.S.C. 1970, C-32,
which was the predecessor to the Canada Business Corporations Act, S.C. 1974-75-76, c.
33. Later, those provisions were re-enacted substantially in the same form in Canada
Business Corporations Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-44 [CBCA).
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as subscriptions for shares, and directors' resolutions issuing or transferring shares). The important implication of all this is that share certificates could not be relied upon. If the shareholder register was different
from the share certificate, then the shareholder register prevailed.2
Although the share certificate was merely a derivative piece of
written evidence of what was contained in the shareholder register, in
actual commercial practice, share certificates were treated as if they
were negotiable instruments. 3 Generally speaking, a negotiable instrument allows a person, known as a transferee, who acquires an instrument
(e.g., a cheque or, in this case, a share certificate), to obtain potentially
better title to the instrument than his/her predecessors. For example, if
the transferor had a defect in his/her title to the instrument, the transferee
could obtain clear title to the instrument if the transferee had (a) no
notice of any defect, (b) given valuable consideration for the instrument,
and (c) acted in good faith.
Accordingly, there was a clear conflict between "law on the books"
and accepted commercial practice. Technically, according to the law at
the time, share certificates were simply written evidence of shareholder
register entries and nothing more. One could not rely upon them. However, in commercial practice, by treating share certificates as negotiable
instruments, innocent transferees could in fact rely upon them.
Thus, Canadian federal corporate law was amended to account for
generally accepted commercial practices. At the time of amendment, the
Canadian government borrowed heavily from Article 8 of the Uniform
Commercial Code ("UCC"). The UCC is a model piece of legislation in
the United States and was developed by two private organizations, the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and the
American Law Institute. Since the UCC was developed by private organizations, it does not officially have the force of law by itself. However, since it has been substantially adopted by the legislatures of virtually all of the states in the U.S.A., the UCC is often synonymous with
the actual law of the state. Ever since the original 1952 edition of the
For a more detailed historical account see Bruce Welling, Corporate I.Aw in Canada, 2nd
ed. (Toronto: Butterworths Canada Ltd., 1991) at 70 I-7rJJ.
-• Ibid., at 702. Welling cites case law establishing that, even though the share certificates
were not actually negotiable instruments, the courts were willing to side with an innocent
transferee. In effect then, this turned the share certificates into something like a negotiable
instrument.

2
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UCC, the UCC has evolved with amendments developed by the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws ("NCCUSL")
and the American Law Institute ("ALf').
The UCC consists of nine numbered articles and each article deals
with a major substantive area of commercial law. 4 Article 8 deals specifically with investment securities and it is this part of the UCC that the
federal government borrowed heavily from when enacting the amendments to CBCA. The overall effect of Canadian federal corporate law
amendments in the mid- l 970s was ''to confer upon the investment securities of a corporation a negotiable or (perhaps more accurately) quasinegotiable character, so as to facilitate dealings in those securities in
established securities exchanges and other markets."' Those amendments were substantially re-enacted in 19856 and have remained the
same up until the present.
(b)

Overview of Part VII Provisions

Part VII of the CBCA consists of sections 48 to 81 inclusive.
Although a comprehensive review of each section is beyond the scope
of this article, Part VII can be effectively summarized.7 The general
purpose of this part of the CBCA is to govern the transfer or transmission
of a security. 8 The definition of a security under the CBCA is fairly
broad although restricted to instruments issued by a corporation.9 In
•Text of the UCC Articles can be accessed online: <http://www.Jaw.cornell.edu/ucc/
ucc.table.htrnl>. In summary, the topics the UCC Articles relate to arc Article l -General
Provisions, Article 2 - Sales, Article 2A - Leases, Article 3 - Negotiable Instruments,
Article 4 - Bank Deposits, Article 4A - Funds Transfers, Article S - Letters of Credit,
Article 6 - Bulk Transfers and Bulk Sales, Article 7 - Warehouse Receipts, Bills of Lading
and other documents of title, Article 8 - Investment Securities, and Article 9 - Secured
Transactions.
5 Kevin P. McGuiness, The Law and Practice of Canadian Business Corporations (Toronto:
Butterworths Canada Ltd., 1999) at 587.
6
Supra, n. I.
7 For a more detailed and section by section description of CBCA Part VII provisions, see H.
Sutherland, ed., Fraser's Handbook on Canadian Company Law, 8th ed. (Toronto: Carswell,
1994).
• CBCA, supra, n. l, s. 48(1 ).
• Section 48(2) of the CBCA, ibid., states that a "security" or "security certificate" means an
instrument issued by a corporation that is
(a) in bearer, order or registered form,
(b) of a type commonly dealt in on securities exchanges or markets or commonly
recognized in any area in which it is issued or dealt in as a medium for investment,
(c) one of a class or series or by its terms divisible into a class or series of instruments,

6

BANKING & FINANCE LAW REVIEW

[23 B.F.L.R.]

contrast, the definition of a security under the Securities Act (Ontario)
is much broader and includes items as diverse as a document constituting
evidence of an interest in scholarship or educational plan or trust. 10
Also related to Part VII are sections located in other parts of the
CBCA that also deal with restrictions on transfer. These sections state
if there are ownership, issue, or transfer restrictions then these are to be
noted in the articles of incorporation 11 and if the articles of incorporation
are to be amended such that there is a change, addition, or deletion of
such restrictions, then such an amendment requires a special resolution
of the shareholders. 12
Essentially, Part VII of the CBCA is a self-contained set of transfer
rules for corporate securities that has the effect of turning corporate
securities into negotiable instruments (except where there are transfer
restrictions noted on the security certificate). 13 In addition, there are
some general rules of an administrative nature regarding (a) the rights
of a holder to have a security certificate or written acknowledgement of
such a right, (b) the contents of a share certificate, restrictions noted on
a certificate, and other fonnalities, 14 and (c) the establishment of a securities register in which the names of shareholders and number of shares
held are kept. 15
In the establishing this code of transfer rules, there are two key
concepts: "adverse claim" and "bona fide purchaser." 16 An adverse claim
includes a claim that a transfer was or would be wrongful or that a
particular adverse person has an interest in the security. A bona fide
purchaser means as purchaser for value in good faith and without any
notice of any adverse claim who takes delivery of a security in the proper
form. The key idea here is that a bona fide purchaser takes a security
free and clear of any adverse claims, 17 subject to a few exceptions. This
and
(d) evidence of a share, panicipation or other interest in or obligation of a corporation.
w Securities Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. S5, s. I [OSA].

CBCA, supra, n. I, s. 6(d).
Ibid.• s. 174.
" Ibid.• s. 48(3).
14
Ibid.• s. 49.
" Ibid., s. 50.
1• Ibid.• s. 48(2): these definitions are a key part of the negotiable nature of security certificates
11

12

17

established under this pan.
Ibid .• s. 60.
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concept allows for the freer flow of corporate securities by minimizing
the number of inquiries that an innocent transferee must make regarding
the corporate securities in question.
The CBCA sets up a number of more detailed rules that support
the general concept of negotiability of corporate securities. Certain evidentiary presumptions, such as presumptions as to validity of signatures,
are set out. 18 Lack of a genuine certificate may defeat a bona fide purchaser19 and a bona fide purchaser may be deemed to have notice of an
adverse claim under certain circumstances including where terms are
noted on the security2() or where there are particular endorsements on
the security. 21 The CBCA also provides for warranties given to the
purchaser and issuer as well as warranties given by intermediaries,
pledges, and brokers.22
There is also a set of rules regarding the types of endorsement that
may be used to transfer a security (e.g., special endorsement, blank
endorsement, etc.) as well as definitions of the appropriate persons who
may make such endorsements (e.g., person specified on the security, or
a person acting under an applicable power of attomey). 23
Another key idea that completes this self-contained transfer code
is the concept of the issuer being under a duty to register a transfer. If
all the formalities have been properly complied with (e.g., proper endorsement) and the transfer is rightful or to a bona fide purchaser, then
the issuer is under a general obligation to register the transfer on the
books. 24 This important concept ties the security certificate (which is a
negotiable instrument) to substantive rights. A bona fide purchaser can
obtain a security certificate free and clear of adverse claims. In tum, as
long as the proper procedures have been met, the bona fide purchaser
can then require the issuer to register the transfer on the securities
register.
18

Ibid., s. 53.
Ibid., s. 55(3).
20 Ibid., s. 55(1 ).
21 Ibid., s. 61(1).
22 Ibid., s. 63.
23 Ibid., s. 65.
24
Ibid., s. 76(1). Note that the issuer may require reasonable assurance the endorsement is
genuine. In addition, the issuer may deny the registration if it is under a duty to inquire into
an adverse claim Such duties to inquire are rather limited and found in s. 78 of the CBCA.
19
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The above concept is important because, if the corporate security
certificates are negotiable, then the issuer does not necessarily know
who is the lawful holder of the corporate security certificate at any time.
There may have been many endorsements and transfers of the security
certificate, without any notice to the issuer. As far as the issuer is concerned, it only knows who it has listed on the securities register as a
shareholder. Thus, if a bona fide purchaser for value desires to exercise
the rights associated with the securities in question, then it needs to have
the transfer registered on the securities register.
In addition to the administrative and negotiable instrument provisions, it should be noted that Part VII also plays an important role with
respect to the transmission of corporate securities. Transmissions refer
to a transfer of corporate securities that is founded primarily by operation
by some rule of law as opposed to the voluntary and consensual agreement of two parties. Transmissions often arise in the case of deceased
persons, infants, mentally incompetent persons, missing persons, or
bankrupts. Under such circumstances, the CBCA allows particular persons to be the constructive registered holder. 2s
Thus, it is clear that Part VII of the CBCA contains a variety of
provisions relating to security certificates. Although the amendments in
the mid-1970s introduced provisions that gave legal recognition to the
practice of treating corporate securities as negotiable instruments, Part
VII contains more than that. It also contains the basic administrative
provisions that support the creation of security certificates and security
registries. In addition, Part VII also deals with the fairly important topic
of transmission of securities. With respect to the negotiable nature of
corporate securities, Part VII provides a fairly detailed and self-contained set of rules governing the transfer of corporate securities that
include evidentiary presumptions, key definitions such as bona fide
purchaser and adverse claim, rules regarding endorsement and appropriate signatures, warranties of various key persons, as well as rules
regarding the duties of issuers and the registration of transfers.

25

Ibid.. s. 51 (2). Also see s. 51 (7) which sets the procedural and evidentiary requirements in
order for a person to become a constructive registered holder.
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Case Law Relating to Part VII of the CBCA

A search for cases where the courts had judicially considered the
provisions of Part VII of the CBCA revealed that there have been very
few court judgments that considered these provisions in a significant
way. Relatively speaking, the number of reported cases is very few and
there are approximately twenty court cases that made reference to the
provisions of CBCA Part VII. The vast majority of those court cases
make only cursory references to CBCA Part VII provisions and did not
consider them in a significant way. Although there may be some differences of opinion as to how many cases substantively considered CBCA
Part VII provisions, a fair estimate would be that about five or so cases
have actually made significant reference to the CBCA Part VII provisions over the past thirty-one years. In contrast, other sections of the
CBCA such as the oppression remedy (under s. 241 of the CBCA) have
had much greater judicial scrutiny.26
Below, this article briefly discusses some of the more significant
decisions relating to CBCA Part VII. An overall review of the case law
reveals that the more mundane and administrative provisions relating to
security certificates and transmissions have neither received much judicial attention nor have they been the subject of heated litigation. As
could be expected, it has been the provisions regarding the negotiability
of corporate securities that have received judicial consideration.
One leading case is Javelin International Ltd. (Receiver of) v. Hillier, 21 which dealt with a person who had share certificates endorsed in
blank and received them as a gift. The person had requested that the
corporation register the transfer on the securities registry of the corporation. In this case, the court also dealt with the issue of the validity of
shares issued for inadequate or improper consideration.
In Javelin, the court clearly laid down a number of firm statements
with respect to share certificates and the negotiability principles of Part
VII of the CBCA.

See Poonam Puri & Stephanie Ben-lshai, "The Canadian Oppression Remedy Judicially
Considered: An Empirical Analysis" (2004) 30 Queen's L.J. 79, for an empirical analysis
of a sample of seventy-one cases over a seven-year period.
r1 (1988), (sub nom. Javelin International Lile, Re) (1988) R.J.Q. 1846, 40 B.L.R. 249, EYB
1988-86756, 1988 CarswellQue 28, (1988) Q.J. No. 928 (Que. S.C.) [Javelin].

26
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• A donee is a purchaser under the CBCA but is not the same
as a "bona fide purchaser''. In particular, a bona fide purchaser gives value for the security. This does not mean that
a donee cannot have title to security. It simply means that,
unlike a bona fide purchaser, a donee cannot acquire better
title than the donor.
• It is possible for shares issued illegally or for inadequate I
improper consideration to become a valid instrument where
a purchaser for value obtains the share without notice of any
defect going to its validity.
• More precisely, the CBCA has turned share certificates into
negotiable instruments subject only to limitations where the
restrictions are noted on the face of the share certificate itself.
• Even if the person in possession of the share certificate is a
donee (i.e., not a bona fide purchaser), such a person may
nevertheless require the transfer to be registered on the books
if the transfer was rightful. However, rightful means more
than "not wrongful". Viewing the CBCA as a whole, the
court concluded that transfers should not be registered where
to do so would be to ratify a known or apparent illegality I
irregularity. In addition, where an adverse claim is known to
exist, a transfer should not be registered. Thus, a transfer is
rightful only if it is requested by person who had no knowledge of adverse claims and acquired the security in good
faith from someone who had good title. Any knowledge of
a defect in the transferor's title would not be good faith and
would prevent a transfer from being registered.
In the Javelin case, the court found the testimony of the person
requesting the transfer to be unreliable. A transfer could only be registered if either the person was a bona fide purchaser or if the transfer was
rightful. The person in possession of the share certificates was not a
bona fide purchaser for value (the person received the shares as a gift)
and could not require on transfer on that basis. Under the circumstances,
the court was unconvinced that this person took the share certificates
without any notice of the defects, and as a result, this person also lacked
the good faith required for a person requesting a registration of a rightful
transfer.

--
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In the case of Csak v. Aumon,28 the court affirmed the proposition
that a share certificate is not actually the share itself. Invoking equitable
principles, the court held that it is not necessary for share certificates to
be issued for a person to be the beneficial owner of shares. In this case,
the court found that the lack of legal title did not prevent beneficial
owners from bringing applications under the oppression remedy provisions of the CBCA.
The case of Ultrama.r Canada Inc. v. Montreal Pipe Line Ltd. 29
intertwines the transfer registry provisions with the duties of directors.
The court held that, even where the articles of incorporation provided
the directors with the discretion to refuse to register a transfer, the
directors must exercise this discretion in good faith. Good faith in this
context means that the directors should refuse only with a view to the
best interests of the corporation. In this case, the court found that the
directors refused to register the transfer in order to advance the interests
of one group of shareholders over another and that such actions were a
breach of the directors' duties.
In Verdun v. Toronto Dominion Bank,'30 the Supreme Court of
Canada held that the corporation is entitled to treat the registered owner
of the shares as the person entitled to vote to the exclusion of all other
persons. The corollary result of this was that it was further held that an
unregistered beneficial shareholder would not be entitled to vote or
submit a shareholder proposal.

This case underscores the importance of registration of a transfer
to a bona fide purchaser. In Javelin, registration of transfer is what the
petitioner was seeking from the court, though it was ultimately denied
for the reasons explained above. Further, in Ultrama.r, the directors were
found to be in breach of their duties for wrongfully refusing to register
a transfer. Finally, the Verdun case illustrates the important consequences flowing from registration on the securities register of the corporation. 31
28

(1990), 69 D.L.R. (4th) 567, 1990 CarswellOnt 915, [1990) O.J. No. 534 (Ont. H.C.).
(1990), 74 O.R. (2d) 136, 49 B.L.R. 279, 1990 CarswellOnt 134, [1990) O.J. No. 1271
(Ont. H.C.); supplemental reasons to be found at (1990), 75 O.R. (2d) 498, 46 C.P.C. (2d)
184, [1990) O.J. No. 1884, 1990 Carswe110nt426 (Ont. Gen. Div.) [Ultramar].
30 [1996) 3 S.C.R. 550, 1996 CarswellOnt 3943, 1996Carswe110nt 3944, 940.A.C. 211, 203
N.R. 60, 139 D.L.R. (4th) 415, 28 B.L.R. (2d) 121, 12 C.C.L.S. 139 (S.C.C.) [Verdun].
31
For an earlier case that mentions a similar principle, see Trans-Mountain Pipeline Co. v.
29
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In passing, two other cases could be noted. First, in the case of Heil
v. T.E.N. Private Cable Systems Inc. 32 the court took a very broad and
flexible interpretation of the definition of "transfer" under s. 48(2) of
the CBCA in its evaluation of the meaning of "transferred after the
record date" under s. 138(2) of the CBCA. The court noted the fact that
the legislature provided a non-exhaustive definition of the term indicates
that the word "transfer" was meant to be interpreted within the objects
of any particular provision as a whole. Second, in the case of LSI Logic
Corp. of Canada Inc. v. Logani, 33 the court held that, pursuant to s.
49( 15) and ( 16) of the CBCA, fractional shares may be acquired without
shareholder consent.
In summary, a review of the significant case law reveals that the
court cases have centered on key concepts such as the definition of
adverse claim, bona fide purchaser, transfer, and the negotiable character
of corporate securities. Other issues that have received focus include
how the corporation deals with registered holders as well as the duty of
the issuer to register a transfer. Some side issues that received attention
include the flexible definition of transfer and the topic of fractional
shares. 34
Inland Natural Gas Co. (1983), 49 B.C.L.R. 126, B.C. Corps. L.G. 78,214, 1983
CarswellBC 330, [1983) B.C.J. No. 1622 (B.C. C.A.), which held that so long as a person
is listed on the securities register, such a person is entitled to any right given to it by law,
including the right to request a meeting under the CBCA.
"(1993), 11 B.L.R. (2d) 54, [1993) B.C.J. No. 1171, 1993 CarswellBC 520 (B.C. S.C.).
33
204 D.L.R. (4th) 443, 2001ABQB710, 2001CarswellAlta1100, [2001) II W.W.R. 740,
296 A.R. 201, 19 B.L.R. (3d) tot, [2001) A.J. No. to83, 96 Alta. L.R. (3d) 162 (Alta.
Q.B.); additional reasons at (2001), 100 Alta. L.R. (3d) 49, 2001 ABQB 968, 2001
CarswellAlta 1733, [2002) 4 W.W.R. 531, [2001] A.J. No. 1751 (Alta. Q.B.).
14
For an excellent digest of the leading cases in these areas, refer to Wayne Gray, ed., The
Annotated Canada Business Corporations Act (Toronto: Carswell, c.2002-) and Wayne
Gray, ed., The Annotated Ontario Business Corporations Act (Toronto: Carswell,
c.2003-). Both of these works were consulted in researching this article. There were other
cases that were reviewed in the statutes judicially considered search that have not been
discussed here because they either (a) were deemed not to contribute in a significant way
to the jurisprudence surrounding Part VII of the CBCA for the purposes of this discussion,
or (b) had principles that were already well covered in cases that were discussed. Cases
that were reviewed include the following: Besnerc. I.A. Besner & Sons (Canada) Ltd., 15
B.L.R. (2d) 261, [ 1993) R.J.Q. 1759, 1993 CarswellQue 29, EYB 1993-84141 (Que. S.C.);
EnCana Corp. v. Douglas (2005), 2005 ABCA 439, 2005 CarswellAlta 1872, [2006) 7
W.W.R. 59, 11 B.L.R. (4th) 198,54 Alta. L.R. (4th) 130, 2620.L.R. (4th) 279(Alta. C.A.);
Imperial Oil Ltd. v. Canada (Director appointed under the Canada Business Corporations
Act) (1996), 11 C.C.L.S. 2 to, t 996 CarswellOnt 2315, [ 1996) O.J. No. 2380, 6 C.P.C. (4th)
170, (sub nom. Imperial Oil Ltd., Re) 6 O.T.C. 385 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]);
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It should be noted that the Ontario Business Corporations Act35
(OBCA), prior to its most recent amendments in 2006, had provisions
that were very similar to the provisions under Part VII of the CBCA.
For the purposes of comparison, a similar search was done for case law
that had judicially considered the analogous OBCA provisions. The
results were very similar to the search done for CBCA case law. Approximately twenty cases were identified as having referred to the relevant analogous OBCA provisions. Of these seventeen cases, roughly
eight to ten of them could be considered as having meaningfully contributed to the jurisprudence for these provisions. 36 The other cases were
Iverson v. Westfair Foods Lid., 38 Alta. L.R. (3d) 331, (1996] 7 W.W.R. 520, 183 A.R.
286, 28 B.L.R. (2d) 87, 1996Carswe11Alta361, [1996] A.J. No. 397 (Alta.Q.B.);affinned
(1998), 67 Alta. L.R. (3d) 148, (1999) 4 W.W.R. 659, 1998 ABCA 337, [1998) A.J. No.
1145, 1998 CarswellAlta 954,41 B.L.R. (2d) 83, 166 D.L.R. (4th)448, (sub nom. Westfair
Foods Ltd. v. Wan) 223 A.R. 322, 183 W.A.C. 322 (Alta. C.A.); leave to appeal refused
(1999), (1998) S.C.C.A. No. 634, 244 A.R. 400 (note), 2()1) W.A.C. 400 (note), 243 N.R.
397 (note) (S.C.C.);Jacobsen v. United CansoOil & Gas Lid., 1130.L.R. (3d)427, 1980
CarswellAlta 261, 11 B.L.R. 313, 23 A.R. 512, (1980) 6 W.W.R. 38 (Alta. Q.B.); Kiliaris
c. R., (1996) 3 C.T.C. 2743, 1996 CarswellNat 1795, 97 D.T.C. 7, 1996 CarswellNat 2905
(T.C.C.); affirmed (1999), 1999 CarswellNat 1806, 99 D.T.C. 5700 (Fed. C.A.); Multiple
Access Lid. v. McCutcheon, 1982 CarswellOnt 128, (1982) 2 S.C.R. 161, 138 D.L.R. (3d)
l, 44 N .R. 181, 18 B.L.R. 138, 1982 CarswellOnt 738 (S.C.C.); National Trust Co. v. Trans
Mountain Pipe Line Co. (1983), 43 B.C.L.R. 239, 33 C.P.C. 163, 1983 CarswellBC 46
(B.C. S.C.); Piller Sausages & Delicatessens Lid. v. Cobb International Corp. (2003),
(2003) O.J. No. 2647, 35 B.L.R. (3d) 193, 2003 CarswellOnt 2430 (Ont. S.CJ.); additional
reasons at (2003), 2003 CarswellOnt 2712 (Ont. S.C.J.); affinned(2003), 2003 CarswellOnt
5167, 179 O.A.C. 290, 40 B.L.R. (3d) 88 (Ont. C.A.); Shell Canada Ltd. v. CIBC Mellon
Trust Co. (2003), 2003 CarswellAlta 1859, 2003 ABQB 1058, (2004) 4 W.W.R. 393, 44
C.P.C. (5th) 336, 24 Alta. L.R. (4th) 259, 349 A.R. 276, (2003) AJ. No. 1618 (Alta. Q.B.);
Sparling v. Javelin International Lid., (1986) R.J.Q. 476, EYB 1986-86748, 1986
CarswellQue 352 (Que. S.C.); reversed (1992), (sub nom. Grusk c. Sparling) (1993) R.L.
22, 1992 CarswellQue 150, 44 Q.A.C. 219 (Que. C.A.); and Striefel v. R.,(1999) 3 C.T.C.
2684, 1999 CarswellNat 1043 (T.C.C. [lnfonnal Procedure).
35
Business Corporations Act, R.S.O. 1990 c. 8.19 [OBCA]. The analogous provisions under
the OBCA were found under ss. 53-91 and these sections were more or less analogous to
CBCA Part VII, ss. 48-81. It is important to note that these provisions were recently
amended in a significant way, as will be discussed later in this article.
36 Cases that were identified as significant were Bank Leu AG v. Gaming wttery Corp. (2003),
37 B.L.R. (3d) 1, 2003 CarswellOnt 3103, 175 O.A.C. 143, [2003) O.J. No. 3213, 231
D.L.R. (4th) 251 (Ont. C.A.); leave to appeal refused (2004), 329 N.R. 392 (note), 2004
CarswellOnt 1321, 2004 CarswellOnt 1322, 195 O.A.C. 398 (note) (S.C.C.); Bank Leu AG
v. Gaming Lottery Corp. (2001), 29 B.L.R. (3d) 68, 2001 CarswellOnt 4262, (2001) 0.J.
No. 4715 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]); additional reasons at (2002), 2002 CarswellOnt
1667, (2002) 0.J. No. 2046 (Ont. S.CJ. [Commercial List]); additional reasons at (2002),
2002 CarswellOnt 2861 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]); aff'mned (2003), 2003
CarswellOnt 3103, 175 O.A.C. 143, (2003) 0.J. No. 3213, 37 BL.R. (3d) l, 231 D.L.R.
(4th) 251 (Ont. C.A.); leave to appeal refused (2004), 329 N.R. 392 (note), 2004
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still noted though their contribution to the jurisprudence was arguably
of less value. 37 Given the recent heavy amendments and deletions to the
analogous OBCA provisions (to be discussed later in this article), the
value of this OBCA case law to future jurisprudence is unclear. It is
interesting to note that a jurisdiction with a high degree of commercial
activity such as Ontario had few significant cases as well.

3.

ANALYSIS OF CBCA PART VII UNDER CURRENT
CIRCUMSTANCES

This part of the article analyzes the relevance of CBCA Part VII
by drawing upon the previous discussion of its history, basic functions,
and case law, and comparing that discussion to the present circumstance
in the Canadian marketplace. In particular, emphasis will be placed upon
(a) a discussion of the policy rationales of CBCA Part VII, (b) a review
of the current market practices with respect to the transfer of securities,
CarswellOnt 1321, 2004 CarswellOnt 1322, 195 O.A.C. 398 (note) (S.C.C.);BankLeuAG
v. Gaming Lottery Corp. (2000), 6 8.L.R. (3d) 77, 2000 CarswellOnt 1707 (Ont. S.C.J.);
leave to appeal allowed (2000), 2000 CarswellOnt 4882 (Ont. Div. Ct.); reversed (2001),
2001 CarswellOnt 893 (Ont. Div. Ct.); Evanov v. Burlington Broadcascing Inc. (1997), 29
O.T.C. 102, 1997 CarswellOnt 1474, [1997] O.J. No. 1781 (Ont. Gen. Div.); Gillespie v.
Retail Merchants' Assn. of Canada (Ontario) Inc. (1997), 1997 CarswellOnt 1244 (Ont.
Gen. Div.); Peat Marwick Ltd. v. Goldfarb (1983), 40 O.R. (2d) 330, 1983 CarswellOnt
151, 21 8.L.R. 172, 44 C.8.R. (N.S.) 174, 2 P.P.S.A.C. 237, 142 D.L.R. (3d) 470 (Ont.
C.A.); Suddaby v. 864226 Ontario Inc. (2003), 31 8.L.R. (3d) 119, 2003 CarswellOnt 258
(Ont. S.C.J.); additional reasons at (2003), 2003 CarswellOnt 3867 (Ont. S.C.J.); reversed
(2004), 2004 CarswellOnt 2512, [2004] O.J. No. 2536 (Ont. C.A.); Tam v. Can-Sling Ltd.
(1994), [1994] O.J. No. 659, 1994 CarswellOnt 2602 (Ont. Gen. Div.); Vella-Zarb v.
Canhorn Chemical Corp. (1996), 9 O.T.C. 182, 1996 CarswellOnt 2681 (Ont. Gen. Div.);
and Stathakis v. York Farmers Marketing Ltd. (2004), 2004 CarswellOnt 1469, 9 8.L.R.
(4th) 107, [2004] O.J. No. 1498 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]); additional reasons at
(2004), 2004 CarswellOnt 2507 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]).
37
These cases of lesser importance included: Beechwood Cemetery Co. v. Graham ( 1996),
12 C.C.L.S. 197, 1996 CarswellOnt 2569, 8 O.T.C. 28, [1996] O.J. No. 2364 (Ont. Gen.
Div.); additional reasons at (1996), 1996 CarswellOnt 5167, 22 O.T.C. 317 (Ont. Gen.
Div.); affirmed (1998), 1998 CarswellOnt 4905, 41 8.L.R. (2d) 186, 117 O.A.C. 71 (Ont.
C.A.); affirmed(l998), 1998Carswell0nt4904,41 8.L.R. (2d) 171, 117 O.A.C. 59, [1998]
O.J. No. 5289 (Ont. C.A.); Blue Resources Ltd. v. Sherriff( 1994), (sub nom. Blue Resources
Ltd. v. Law Society of Upper Canada (Senior Disciplinary Counsel)) 120 D.L.R. (4th) 751,
1994 CarswellOnt 129 (Ont. Gen. Div.); additional reasons at (1994), 1994 CarswellOnt
4217 (Ont. Gen. Div.); Cameron & Johnstone Ltd. v. Ha"op (1996), 1996 CarswellOnt
3678 (Ont. Gen. Div.); Mian v. Kalezic (2002), 2002 CarswellOnt 208 (Ont. S.C.J.);
affirmed (2003), 2003 CarswellOnt 4246 (Ont. C.A.); R. v. Pomeroy (1995), [1995] O.J.
No. 590, 1995 CarswellOnt 2888 (Ont. Gen. Div.); Sportscope Television Network Ltd. v.
Shaw Communications Inc. ( 1999), 46 8.L.R. (2d) 87, 1999 CarswellOnt 630 (Ont. Gen.
Div. [Commercial List]); and Teddy Bear Valley Mines Ltd., Re (1993), I C.C.L.S. 97,
[1993] O.J. No. 1588, 1993 CarswellOnt 907 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]).
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(c) a review of the current changes being made to provincial corporate
statutes with respect to security transfers, and (d) an analysis of the
appropriate and desirable role of CBCA Part VII in light of the policy
rationales of the CBCA as a whole as well as the foregoing points.

(a)

Policy Rationale for CBCA Part VII

A close reading of CBCA Part VII reveals that the provisions of
this part are actually operating at two distinct levels.
At one basic level, the administrative provisions of CBCA Part VII create the
legal authority for the basic book-keeping necessary to a corporation. For example, the details regarding the creation of a securities register are clearly articulated38 and the important legal consequences of transfers noted on the securities
register are set forth. 39 1bere are also details about the form of share certificates.40
The provisions concerning transmission fulfill an important role by setting forth
who may act as a registered holder in circumstances where the actual registered
holder is unable to act (e.g., deceased, mentally incompetent, etc.).41 Thus, at this
level, the CBCA Part VII provisions provide some of the required structure so
that shareholders may exercise their rights under corporate law. In this sense,
these provisions are supportive of the basic tenet that corporate law should assist
the exercise of rights by shareholders.

However, the amendments to the Canada Corporations Act (the
predecessor to the CBCA), in the mid-1970s, created a second dimension
to the CBCA Part VII provisions, which inherited such amendments. As
discussed above, these amendments were introduced to reflect the already ongoing market practice of treating security or share certificates
as negotiable instruments.42 Turning share certificates into negotiable
instruments had the effect of increasing the marketability of share certificates by allowing such instruments to flow more freely from one
person to another. As long as one was a bona fide purchaser for value,
CBCA, supra, n. l, s. 50(1).
Section 51 ( 1) of the CBCA, ibid., states that, aside from a few exceptions, the corporation
may treat the registered owner of a security as the person exclusively entitled to vote, to
receive notices, to receive any interest, dividend, or other payments in respect of the security,
and otherwise to exercise all the rights and powers of an owner of the security. This was
illustrated in the Verdun case, supra, n. 30.
40
See s. 49 of the CBCA generally, ibid.
4 1 See s. 51 (7) of the CBCA, ibid.
• 2 Supra, n. 2. Professor Welling notes that, in certain court cases, judges would also treat
share certificates as negotiable instruments. Although the judges did not necessarily use
the terminology of "negotiable instruments" they tended to favor the innocent transferee
using available legal constructs to support such a result. The end result was that the share
certificates had the same effect as if they were negotiable instruments. Welling notes, in
particular, the case of Smith v. Rogers (1899), 30 O.R. 256 (Ont. C.A.).
38
39
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one was relatively certain that one had obtained title to the security
certificate.
A key point to note here is that the amendments were introduced
to merely reflect market practices that were already in existence and
generally well accepted by the financial community. As has been noted:
The purpose of the C.B.C.A. rules, and of Article 8 of the Uniform Commercial
Code from which they were adapted, was to provide a legal basis for the existing
market treatment of corporate securities. The rules were designed to permit reliable securities transactions with a minimum of effort wasted on title investigations, for these are conditions essential to a liquid securities market. 43

CBCA Part VII can be viewed as a set of legal provisions designed
to support market efficiency by providing more legal certainty to widespread and prevailing market practices. This change was efficient, not
only because the marketplace had adopted these practices, but also
because the substantive practices themselves created a more fluid market
for securities. The amendments were not viewed as an intrusive attempt
by government to impose a regime of transacting. Rather, they were
accepted with open arms as providing the necessary legal certainty to
well-accepted market practices.
There are also two more reasons why the amendments could be
viewed, at the time, as efficient and transaction enhancing. First, by
borrowing heavily from UCC Article 8, the Canadian parliament made
a significant step towards an attempt at harmonizing legislation with the
United States, an important trade partner for Canada as well as one of
the leading financial centres in the world. Second, the amendments
assisted in detailing transfer provisions for corporate securities in one
place and, in comparison to the prior state of affairs, provided a more
manageable state of affairs. This is not to suggest that the present CBCA
Part VII provisions are a comprehensive code or "one stop shop" for
legal provisions relating to corporate securities. Indeed, it has been noted
that, depending on the type of institution involved (e.g., bank, insurance
company, loan and trust company, or cooperative credit associations),
different sets oflegislative rules may apply. 44 However, relatively speak43

Ibid.

44

See B. Geva, "Legislative Power in Relation to Transfers of Securities: The Case for
Provincial Jurisdiction in Canada" (2004) 19 B.F.L.R. 393 at 397, where Geva notes that
"existing legislation is neither harmonious nor internally consistent, and its application is
not always certain."
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ing, it could be regarded as efficient in comparison to the prior vacuum
of law. In short, the amendments were efficiency-enhancing for the
period albeit far short of establishing a comprehensive and uniform law
for corporate securities.
Thus, the policy rationales for CBCA Part VII can actually be
regarded as bifurcated given the fact that CBCA Part VII has two different functions - one relating to administrative support of the CBCA
and the other relating to negotiability of corporate securities. With respect to the administrative provisions that provide some core functionality, the policy rationale is fairly simple. These provisions are supportive and establish the basic records which assist shareholder in exercising
their rights. The negotiability provisions introduced in the mid- l 970s
have a number of policy rationales which can be summarized as:
• supporting and legitimizing accepted, sound, and widespread market practices;
• harmonizing with important trade partners and jurisdictions;
and
• contributing to ease of legal reference by moving towards
comprehensive provisions.

(b)

Current Market Practices with Respect to the Transfer of
Securities

In the current financial marketplace, there are two methods by
which securities are held: the direct holding system and the indirect
holding system. CBCA Part VII only contemplates a direct holding
system for securities and does not have any provisions addressing the
indirect holding system.
The direct holding system may be viewed as the "traditional
method" of securities holding whereby securities were transferred by
means of a physical certificate. Transfer of a security was accomplished
when the owner of the security endorsed the certificate in blank (usually
by signing on the back of the certificate without naming any particular
transferee) and delivered physical possession of the endorsed certificate
to the purchaser. The purchaser could easily resell the certificate by
delivering the certificate to a subsequent purchaser. Since the certificate
was still endorsed in blank, the purchaser could transfer it to the subsequent purchaser.
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At any time, a purchaser could surrender the certificate to the issuer
(i.e., the corporation) for a new certificate (usually issued to the purchaser and naming the purchaser on the front of the certificate). At the
same time, the issuer would usually register the transfer on its securities
register and the purchaser would now appear as the registered holder of
the certificate. This is referred to as the "direct holding system" because
the securities are directly held and the owners of the securities have a
direct relationship with the issuer.
CBCA Part VII (and the old UCC Article 8 provisions upon which
it was based) facilitated the direct holding system, as has been discussed,
by providing a detailed set of rules regarding the transfer and negotiability of securities under such a system. Since the CBCA only addresses
direct holdings, an underlying and unstated assumption is that the direct
holding system is the method by which most securities transactions
occur. However, this is not the case.
Presently, the dominant method for the holding of the vast volume
of securities that are traded on the Canadian market is by the indirect
holding system. In the indirect holding system, an investor's proprietary
interest in a security is recorded on the books of an intermediary. The
intermediary is usually a licensed security broker, bank, or custodian.
In tum, this intermediary may have its interests recorded on the books
of another intermediary up the chain. This chain of intermediaries can
continue upwards and ultimately ends in either one of two possibilities:
either that the last intermediary (a) actually has physical possession the
security certificates, or (b) is recorded by the issuer as being the registered holder of the security. Typically, this last intermediary at the top
of the chain is a central securities depository. 45
In Canada, the primary central securities depository is the Canadian
Depository for Securities Limited ("CDS")46 while in the U.S., it is the
Depository Trust Company ("DTC"). 47
The indirect holding system is considered much more efficient than
the direct holding system. The actual physical delivery of certificates
For an excellent overview of the foregoing, see Eric T. Spink & Maxime A. Pare, '1'he
Uniform Securities Transfer Act: Globalized Commercial Law For Canada" (2004) 19
B.F.L.R. 321at324-331.
46
See CDS online: <www.cds.ca>.
41
See OTC online: <www.dtc.org>.
45
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contemplated by the direct holding system can be extremely costly given
the large volume of trading that occurs in the marketplace. In contrast,
the indirect holding system is much more efficient in that it does not
rely on the physical delivery of certificates but, instead, relies on a book
entry settlement system. The present reality is that most publicly traded
securities are registered in the name of CDS & Co., which is the nominee
for CDS. 48 The result is that CDS is often the "last intermediary" holding
the vast majority of publicly traded securities. The benefit of this practice
is that transactions among lower tiered intermediaries can be accomplished by mere book entries to their CDS accounts as opposed to the
tedious delivery of physical share certificates.
The indirect holding system's superior efficiency is evident by the
number and value of trades generated. CDS presently holds over $27
trillion on deposit and handles over 77 million securities trades annually. 49 The use of CDS seems to also be on rise. In 2004, CDS handled
an average of 166,600 exchange trades per day. However, in 2005 the
average was 218,000 trades per day representing a remarkable 31 per
cent increase over 2004.so Clearly, a quick glance at the these CDS
figures indicates the dominance of the indirect holding system in Canada.
Similarly, large numbers exist for the U.S. and indicate the widespread prevalence of the indirect holding system there.' 1 The U.S. did
respond to the rise of the indirect holding system. In 1994, the ALI and
NCCUSL approved a revised version of UCC Article 8 ("Rev. UCC Art.
8"), which provided a legal basis and infrastructure for the practice of
indirect holding as well as made some minor adjustments to the direct
holding system. In tum, these revisions were all accepted by most of the
states and adopted. Rev. UCC Art. 8 was the product of extensive work
over a five-year period including consultations with knowledgeable interest groups.' 2
48

Spink, supra, n. 45.
CDS, supra. n. 46.
"' See CDS Annual Report 2005 at 4, available at CDS website, supra, n. 46. In addition, on
6 October 2005 there was a record breaking 387,360 exchange trades processed.
51 See DTCC Annual Report 2004 online: <http://www.dtcc.com/AboutUs/2004annuaV
DTCC-2004-AnnuaLReport.pdf>. In the U.S., the DTS is owned by the Depository
Trust and Clearing Corporation (the "DTCC"). In 2004, the DTCC settled transactions
valued at over $1. l quadrillion, which is equivalent to approximately $4.5 trillion worth of
transactions each day.
52 See J. S Rogers, "Policy perspectives on revised U.C.C. Article 8" (1996) 43 UCLA L.

49

20

BANKING & FINANCE LAW REVIEW

[23 B.F.L.R.]

Despite the fact the indirect holding system is dominant in Canada
as well as in its major trading partner, the U.S., there are currently no
federal Canadian statutory provisions that directly address, support, or
legitimate this practice. Ontario did attempt a partial solution in its
OBCA provisions analogous to CBCA Part VIL In 1986, Ontario tried
to reconcile the indirect holding system within its own OBCA statutory
provisions by creating the concept of "constructive delivery". In essence,
s. 85 of the OBCA states that once the appropriate entry has been made
in the records of the applicable clearing agency,s 3 such a book entry
transfer is deemed to have the same effect as the actual physical delivery
of the share certificate. s4 For all practical purposes, "applicable clearing
agency" means the CDS. However, this solution is incomplete since it
only contemplates those intermediaries who are directly listed as holders
within the books of CDS. It does not address the many other intermediaries and investors that exist below this top-tier of intermediaries.
Ontario has recently enacted legislation, the Securities Transfer
Ads ("STA"), in light of the inadequacies of s. 85 of the OBCA in
handling the concept of indirect holding. The implications of the Ontario

Rev. 1435 for an excellent overview of the process that took place in the U.S. Rogers notes
that meetings were arranged with individual securities firms, banks, transfer agents, lenders,
as well as with large industry organizations. Moreover, representatives of the Securities
Exchange Commission, the Department of Treasury, the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System, and many other important government institutions attended each drafting
session.
" OBCA, supra, n. 35, s. 85( 1). This section states:
If a security shown in the records of a clearing agency is evidenced by,
(a) a security certificate in the custody of the clearing agency or a custodian or of a
nominee of either, subject to the instructions of the clearing agency, and is in bearer
form or endorsed in blank by an appropriate person or registered in the name of the
clearing agency or a custodian or of a nominee of either; or
(b) an uncertificated security registered or recorded in records maintained by oron behalf
of the issuer in the name of the clearing agency or a custodian or of a nominee of either,
subject to the instructions of the clearing agency,
then, in addition to other methods, a transfer or pledge of the security or any interest
therein may be effected by the making of an appropriate entry in the records of the
clearing agency.
" OBCA, ibid., s. 85(3) states: "A transfer or pledge under this section has the effect of a
delivery of a security in bearer form or duly endorsed in blank representing the amount of
the obligation or the number of shares or rights transferred or pledged."
"Securities Transfer Act, S.O. 2006, c. 8 [Ontario STA]. As of the time of the writing of this
article, this legislation has been passed in Ontario though it is not yet in force. The new
legislation will be discussed in the next part of this article.
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STA, which has been enacted though not yet in force, will be discussed
in the next part of this article.
The present situation is somewhat ironic, given the original underlying rationales for the current version of CBCA Part VII - to establish
a statutory regime that reflected efficient market practices, harmonize
with the major financial jurisdictions, and move towards a more unified
set of rules for corporate securities. In fairness, at the time the current
CBCA Part VII provisions were enacted, these rationales could have
been fairly said to have been reasonably fulfilled given the circumstances
of the time. However, in the three decades that have passed since CBCA
Part VII was enacted, the market practices in Canada and in other major
jurisdictions such as the U.S. have moved on.
The result is that the original underlying rationales have become
disconnected with the present commercial realities. Given the fact that
the CBCA Part VII provisions do not address the dominant indirect
holding system in Canada, they neither reflect current commercial practices in Canada nor harmonize with the major financial jurisdiction of
the U.S. Lastly, rather than move towards a more unified set of rules for
corporate securities, the present CBCA Part VII provisions run the hazard of either unnecessarily duplicating or interacting in an uncertain way
with remedial provincial legislation aimed at addressing indirect holding.
The current situation is strangely reminiscent of Canadian federal
corporate law prior to the amendments of the mid-1970s. During that
time period, the legislation awaited amendments to bring it in line with
market practices of negotiability. Similarly, the present CBCA awaits a
response to the modem commercial realities of indirect holding.

(c)

Current Developments with Provincial Corporate Statutes

The Ontario STA was recently passed by the Ontario legislature
(May 2006) though it is not yet in force and awaits proclamation by
Lieutenant Governor of Ontario. Similarly, Alberta has passed its own
Securities Transfer ActS6 and, it too, is not yet in force. Both the Ontario
STA and Alberta STA have virtually identical provisions. Ontario and
Alberta have delayed bringing their respective statutes into force (for
56

Securities Transfer Act, S.A. 2006, c. S-4.S [Alberta STA].
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about six to eight months) in the hopes of allowing other provinces the
opportunity to harmonize their legislation with the Ontario I Alberta
versions.
Both the Ontario and Alberta statutes were heavily influenced by
the model "Uniform Securities Transfer Act" ("USTA") prepared by the
Canadian Securities Administrators (CSA). 57 The CSA is a non-legislative forum without the formal authority to enact any laws that allows
the thirteen provincial and territorial securities regulators to coordinate
and harmonize Canada's capital markets regulation. Similar to the ALI
and NCCUSL, the CSA is a very influential organization that consults
regularly with relevant government and industry bodies regarding relevant issues. The analogy between the CSA and the ALI and NCCUSL
is somewhat appropriate given how the USTA was very strongly based
on the provisions of Rev. UCC Art. 8 (which itself was drafted by the
ALI and NCCUSL). The fact that the USTA drew so heavily on Rev.
UCC Art. 8 is not inconsistent with prior Canadian experiences given
that the mid- l 970s amendments to the CBCA were also drawn from the
UCC. In the final result, both the Ontario and Alberta statutes have
incorporated substantially all of the recommendations of the USTA.
A more detailed discussion of the policy rationales and thinking
behind the USTA can be found in the USTA Consultation paper entitled
"Proposal for a Modernized Uniform Law in Canada Governing the
Holding, Transfer and Pledging of Securities" ("USTA Consultation
Paper"). 58 The USTA is intended to modernize the law of securities
transfer in Canada.
In attempting to modernize the law of securities transfer in Canada,
the USTA proposes changes not only to corporate statutes but also to a
variety of other statutes including statutes dealing with personal property
security interests. It is beyond the scope of this article to discuss in any
detail those changes but it should be noted that such changes are intended
to bring greater certainty in the manner in which a security interest is
Approved at the Uniform Law Conference of Canada, Annual Meeting on 22-26 August
2004. A copy of the USTA may be obtained online: Ontario Securities Commission <http:/
/www .osc.gov .on.ca/MarketRegulation/SpecialProjects/usta/ustll-20041112-taskforce.pdf >.
'" A copy of the UST A Consultation Paper can be found online: Ontario Securities Commission <http://www.osc.gov .on.ca/MarketRegulation/SpecialProjects/usta/ustll-20040528_
consultation-paper.pdf >.

57
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granted in corporate shares or related securities (i.e., pledging corporate
shares as collateral).
In tenns of methodology, the USTA Consultation Paper proposes
to remove the direct holding provisions from provincial corporate statutes and place them, with slight modifications, within the USTA. With
respect to indirect holding, a new set of provisions will be implemented.
Both the direct and indirect holding provisions in the USTA are substantially founded upon Rev. UCC Art. 8.
(i)

Direct holding system

The basic tenets of the direct holding system are not substantially
changed by the USTA. For example, the provisions in Part VI of the
OBCA (which is analogous to Part VIl of the CBCA) regarding the
direct holding system are to be deleted and will be re-enacted in a
functionally similar fashion in the Ontario STA.s9 Not all provisions of
OBCA Part VI will be deleted. The administrative provisions dealing
with securities registers, issuance of certificates, and transmission of
securities will all remain in the OBCA as these are regarded as squarely
within the domain of corporate law.
There will be one substantive change to the direct holding provisions. The USTA replaces the concept of a bona fide purchaser (or good
faith purchaser) with the concept of a "protected purchaser". Similar to
the older concept of a "good faith purchaser", the protected purchaser,
"in addition to acquiring the rights of a purchaser, also acquires the
purchaser's interest in the security free of any adverse claim."6() The
important difference with the new concept of the "protected purchaser"
is that the protected purchaser does not need to demonstrate good faith
in order to take advantage of the protections offered under the STA.
In addition, an entitlement holder may not bring a legal action
against any purchaser of a financial asset where the purchaser has given
value, taken possession or control of the security, and does not act in
collusion with the securities intermediary in violating the securities
intermediary's obligations.61 The term "in collusion" is defined to mean
59

These direct holding provisions can be found in ss. 29-32 (endorsements, instructions, and
entitlement orders), ss. 33-40 (warranties applicable to direct holdings), and interspersed
through Parts III, IV, and V of the Ontario STA, supra, n. SS.
60
Ontario STA, ibid., s. 70.
61 Ibid., s. 97(7).
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"in concert, by conspiratorial arrangement or by agreement for the purpose of violating a person's right in respect of a financial asset."62
The apparent net effect of such changes appears to be to provide
greater protection to a transferee of securities. The requirement that an
entitlement holder prove that the purchaser actively acted in collusion
to deprive the entitlement holder of its rights is arguably a much higher
evidentiary hurdle to surpass than the previous benchmarks of lack of
"good faith" orof "actual notice". Presumably the intent of such a change
is to enhance the free flow of securities by providing an even higher
level of protection to a transferee of securities.
(ii)

Indirect holding system

The USTA provisions relating to indirect holding systems represent
a significant change to Canadian legislative approaches for the transfer
of securities. However, this is not alarming given that the indirect holding
system is widespread in practice in both Canada and the U.S.
The fundamental concept underpinning the indirect holding system
under the USTA is the idea of a "security entitlement". The USTA rejects
the idea that a beneficial owner of a book-based security has any direct
rights against the issuer. After all, the issuer may have no knowledge
whatsoever of the alleged beneficial owner's entitlement, which, in an
indirect holding system, is a book entry in the records of a security
intermediary. Instead, the USTA provides that the beneficial owner of
a book-based security has a bundle of rights that may only be exercised
against the securities intermediary that holds the underlying securities
or assets.
As Professor Geva succinctly explains:
[l]n the indirect holding system, an investor does not hold a security, does not
have a property right in a specific security, and is not in a direct legal relationship
with the security issuer. Rather, an investor in the indirect holding system is the
holder of a securities entitlement, credited to a securities account kept with a
securities intermediary. A security entitlement consists of a bundle of rights
against the securities intermediary backed by financial assets held by the intermediary. Financial assets held by the intermediary may either actual securities or
security entitlements backed by actual securities held by an upper-tier intermediary. Generally speaking, the entitlement holder has a proprietary right in a pool

62

Ibid., s. I (I).
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of financial assets, but not in any one particular asset among those of which the
pool consists.63

Under the Ontario STA, a security entitlement generally arises
when a securities intermediary credits a financial asset to a person's
security account, receives a financial asset from a person, or is obligated
by law to credit a financial asset to a person. 64 The term "financial asset"
has been broadly defined to include not only a security or share but also
any type of obligation that is dealt in or traded in on markets or recognized as a medium for investment.6s Such a broad, neutral drafting
approach ensures that the subject matter for what constitutes a financial
asset is not closed due to lack of legislative foresight and can be properly
reflected by the actual market. The Ontario STA then sets forth a regime
whereby an entitlement holder's rights may on be asserted by the entitlement holder against its own security intermediary. 66
Interestingly, "security transfers" under the USTA provisions (or
under the Ontario STA or Alberta STA) are not really transfers at all. In
a common trade, security entitlements are created not through transfers
per se, but by the creation of a book entry by a security intermediary
(for the "transferee") and the corresponding extinguishing of a security
entitlement on the books of another intermediary (for the "transferor").
The key advantage of this is that it jettisons the old and inefficient idea
of physically delivering certificates and replaces it with a legislative
scheme that more accurately reflects the system of debits and credits
that occurs on the books of securities intermediaries on a day-to-day
basis. 67
Although the entitlement holder does not have a direct property
interest in the underlying securities or a direct right of action against the
issuer, the USTA provides that the entitlement holder will generally
have functionally the same rights (e.g., interest, dividend, and voting
rights) as a direct holder. This is accomplished by the entitlement holder

Geva, supra, n. 44 at 394.
Ontario STA, supra, n. 55, s. 95(1).
"'Ibid., s. 1(1).
66
Generally, see Part VI of the Ontario STA which sets forth detailed provisions.
67 For an excellent and schematically illustrated description of this process, see Spink, supra,
n. 45 at 362, where the author explains a hypothetical transaction that spans Canada and
the U.S. In essence, the only real transfer that occurs is at the top tier, typically between
CDS and OTC.
63

64
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giving directions to the securities intennediary pursuant to the legislation.68
As a final note, the Ontario STA is substantially default /enabling
legislation and the parties may contract out of most of its provisions.69
However, given the prevalence of the indirect holding system, the ability
to contract out is not likely to be invoked for publicly traded securities.

(d) Critical Analysis of the Role ofCBCA Part VII in Light of
Present Circumstances
The analysis of CBCA Part VII is conducted, in the context of the
foregoing discussion, from both the perspective of (a) the policy rationales of the CBCA, as well as (b) the impact of provincial STAs. Finally,
this analysis reflects upon the appropriate role of CBCA Part VII in the
future.
(i)

Context of CBCA policy rationales

Good corporate law is based upon sound policy goals. These policy
goals, generally speaking, are: 70
• enhancing economic efficiency;
• ensuring accountability of corporate managers, directors,
and officers;
• protecting shareholders and other vulnerable parties;
• attracting business to the jurisdiction by inspiring confidence, supporting competitiveness, innovation, and growth;
and
• responding effectively to the needs of larger widely held and
smaller closely held businesses.
An evaluation of CBCA Part VII against these general policy goals
yields slightly different results if one views these provisions as operating
68

See, e.g., Ontario STA, supra, n. 55, s. 100.
Ibid., s. 5. However, note thats. 5(2) contains some exceptions and specifically states: "The
obligations of good faith, diligence, reasonableness and care imposed by this Act may not
be disclaimed by agreement, but the parties may by agreement determine the standards by
which the performance of such obligations is to be measured so long as such standards are
not manifestly unreasonable."
7
° For a detailed discussion, see Poonam Puri, "The Hallmarks of Good Corporate Law: A
Performance Evaluation of the Canada Business Corporations Act," prepared for Corporations Canada, Industry Canada, 2004.
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at two distinct levels as previously mentioned. The administrative provisions provide the fundamental documentary requirements and infrastructure. Although not nearly as powerful as the oppression remedy
provisions, such basic provisions serve to protect shareholders by laying
down a basic administrative structure that can later provide the evidentiary foundation for the exercise of shareholder rights.
In contrast, the current CBCA Part VII provisions relating direct
holding I negotiability of corporate securities do not seem to directly
further any of the above-stated policy goals of corporate law. The placement of negotiability provisions within the CBCA could be viewed as
somewhat out of place when considered in the context of corporate law.
Corporate law is generally concerned with the internal governance of
the corporation and is primarily focused on the responsibilities, duties,
and liabilities of directors and managers, and the rights of shareholders.71
The negotiability provisions do not seem to squarely address any of
those concerns.
When viewed in historical context, one could persuasively argue
that the present CBCA Part VII provisions did fulfill the corporate policy
goal of economic efficiency back in the mid-1970s. The CBCA Part VII
provisions filled a legal vacuum relating to the negotiability of corporate
securities when the law did not keep up with market practice. By filling
this legal vacuum with a comprehensive code modeled on the UCC, the
CBCA Part VII provisions brought a significant increased degree of
legal certainty, at least with regard to the direct holding of corporate
securities, thereby making a contribution to economic efficiency.
In short, one could view the direct holding provisions of CBCA
Part VII as an "awkward but necessary for the time" type of provision
in the absence of any better solution. However, as noted above, times
have changed since the mid-1970s. The rise of the indirect holding
system, along with the corresponding changes to UCC Article 8 simply
cannot be ignored. In addition, the rise of provincial securities transfer
legislation, based upon the more modem Rev. UCC Art. 8, provides a
71

See Poonam Puri, "A Rational Allocation of Responsibility between Corporate and Securities Laws in Canada," prepared for Corporations Canada, Industry Canada, 2004, where
it is noted that corporate statutes do contain a limited number of provisions that protect the
rights of creditors and other stakeholders. For example, s. 42 of the CBCA protects shareholders in the context of directors declaring dividends. Similarly, s. 119 of the CBCA
imposes personal liability on directors for employees' unpaid wages.
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potentially more economically efficient alternative to dealing with both
direct and indirect holding that was not available during the mid-1970s.
(ii)

Impact of provincial securities transfer legislation

In assessing the impact of provincial securities transfer legislation
with respect to CBCA Part VII, it is useful to gauge the UST A policy
objectives against those of the CBCA. The USTA has a number of stated
policy objectives which include the following: 72
• providing a sound legal system for existing securities holding
and transfer practices, particularly the indirect holding system;
• harmonizing with Rev. UCC Art. 8;
• achieving uniformity within Canada by making the USTA a
separate statute; and
• controlling systemic risk, achieving finality of settlement,
and avoiding legal risk.
On a first cursory reading it does not appear that any of these policy
objectives directly conflict with the CBCA. Indeed, some of them are
complementary. Harmonizing with the American UCC can hardly be in
conflict with the CBCA given the present CBCA provisions themselves
were modeled on the prior UCC rules. Although Rev. UCC Art. 8 has
had its modest share of criticism,73 the USTA Consultation Paper makes
it clear that it considers Rev. UCC Art. 8 as generally recognized as the
world's most advanced securities transfer legislation. 74 Furthermore, the
USTA explicitly recognizes the fact that the U.S. and Canadian securities
markets are becoming increasingly more integrated with the attendant
result that harmonization is more desirable than ever.75
72

USTA Consultation Paper, supra, n. 58 at 22-27.
For example, see F. J Facciolo, "Father knows best: revised Article 8 and the individual
investor'' (Spring 2000) 27 Fla. St. U.L. Rev. 615, where the author criticizes revised UCC
article 8 as having ignored the interests of the consumer investor and privileging the interests
of upper tier securities intermediaries. One key criticism is that the consumer investor no
longer has any direct right against the issuer but only an unsecured right against the
intermediary. For a direct reply to such criticism, see C. W. J Mooney Jr., "The Roles of
Individuals in UCC Reform: Is the Uniform Law Process a Potted Plant? The Case of
Revised UCC Article 8" (Summer 2002) 27 Okla. City U.L. Rev. 553.
74
USTA Consultation Paper, supra, n. 58.
75
Ibid.
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Although the current CBCA Part VII provisions were modeled on
the prior UCC, there has been some criticism for not following the UCC
more closely. It has been remarked that there are significant differences
in wording between CBCA Part VII and the UCC provisions upon which
it was modeled. "It is often unclear whether these changes in wording
were intended to make some substantive alteration to the American rule
or were motivated primarily by the idiosyncratic preferences of the
Canadian draftsperson."76 On the other hand, the present USTA Consultation Paper makes it clear that the USTA seeks to avoid this form of
confusion by relying and borrowing heavily on the wording from Rev.
UCCArt. 8.
It is also worth noting that Rev. UCC Art. 8 also comes with an
extensive set of official commentary (prepared by the NCCUSL and
ALI) on each of its provisions. In the U.S., these commentaries are
intended to act as an interpretive aid for the provisions of the UCC as
enacted by each state. Although there is no firm Canadian tradition of
the judiciary relying upon such commentaries, the authors of the USTA
make reference to a few Canadian decisions that referred to the official
comments of the UCC in interpreting Canadian legislation.77 To that
end, the USTA itself comes with its own commentary .78 It is interesting
to note that the USTA commentary, as might be expected, is substantially
similar to the official commentary to Rev. UCC Art. 8. The similarity is
to such an extent that the cover page notes that some of the commentary
is quoted directly from the official commentary of Rev. UCC Art. 8 with
the legal permission of ALI and NCCUSL.
Thus, the harmonization of the USTA with the American UCC is
consistent with the prior history of the CBCA. In fact, the USTA goes
further by borrowing more heavily from the wording of the UCC as well
as implementing its own commentary, which in turn also borrows heavily from the UCC Official Comments.
The USTA goals of controlling systemic risk, achieving finality of
settlement, and controlling legal risk are also consistent with the CBCA
76
77

78

McGuiness, supra, n. 5 at 587.
USTA Consultation Paper, supra, n. 58, at 35.
See UTSA with detailed comments (approved by the ULCC) and available online: Ontario
Securities Commission <http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/MarketRegulation/SpecialProjects/
usta/usta...20041112.....task-force.pdf>.
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rationale of achieving economic efficiency. All of the goals can fairly
be said to be sub-variants of economic efficiency.
However, two of the goals of the USTA have the potential of being
problematic in light of CBCA Part VII. At first glance, the UST A goals
of providing a legal infrastructure for existing securities practices and
for achieving unity in Canada could seem consistent with CBCA Part
VII policy rationales. Arguably, they are consistent but lack of coordination between the CBCA and provincial STAs could be potentially
problematic.
With respect to indirect holdings, there is no immediate problem
since the CBCA does not address that matter. In this case, provincial
legislation such as the Ontario STA and Alberta STA serves the useful
function of filling a void in the legislation. However, if the CBCA is
later amended to address indirect holdings, there is the potential for a
confusing and duplicative array of legislation.
Even more immediate is the issue of direct holding. The Ontario
STA applies to both direct and indirect holdings of securities. The Ontario STA states that if the issuer is incorporated under federal law, then
the validity of the security is determined by the laws of Canada.79 However, for matters such as registration of transfer, whether an adverse
claim may be asserted against a person, and other transfer issues, the
Ontario STA states that the law that applies is the law of the issuer's
jurisdiction.80 In turn, it is stated that, in the case of an issuer incorporated
under the law of Canada, the law of the issuer's jurisdiction is the
province or territory in which the issuer has its registered head office. 81
Let us assume that a federally incorporated business corporation
has its registered head office in Ontario. According to the Ontario STA,
the governing law for the validity of the security is the CBCA, but the
governing law for the transfer of the security would be that of Ontario
(where the head office is located). However, the CBCA has its own
transfer provisions for direct holdings. If it were a direct holding in
question, then there would be potentially two different sets of rules to
apply - the Ontario STA and the CBCA Part VII provisions.
Ontario STA, supra, n. 55, s. 44( I).
Ibid., s. 44(2).
•• Ibid., s. 44(5). Note that for Crown corporations, the governing law is that specified by the
issuer.
1•
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This whole issue could be moot if both the Ontario STA and CBCA
Part VII provisions were identical. However, as noted earlier in this
article, the Ontario STA makes use of the new term "protected purchaser" while the CBCA Part VII provisions make use of the older
concept of good faith or bona fide purchaser. This can be potentially
problematic since the new term "protected purchaser" ostensibly provides more protection to the transferee. In contrast to this, as Part 2 of
this article explored, the Javelin case82 was decided under the CBCA
and made specific reference to the concept of a bona fide purchaser. The
statutory provisions of the Ontario STA could potentially come into
conflict with CBCA Part VII and the decided case law.
It is arguable that the likelihood that such a conflict would actually
arise is quite remote (given the relatively low incidence of reported case
law and the less frequent use of the direct holding system in comparison
to the indirect holding system). One might also argue that, in fact, most
cases could possibly have the same result regardless of whether one uses
the protected purchaser standard or bona fide purchaser standard. Nevertheless, such uncertainty should be clearly addressed since it goes
against the efficiency policy goals of both the USTA and CBCA. There
must be a rational allocation of responsibility between the CBCA and
USTA and this is the issue that is considered next.
(iii)

Future role of CBCA Part VII provisions

An attempt to gauge the future role of the CBCA Part VII provisions
can be taken from a variety of different perspectives. One tempting route
would be to analyze the issue from a constitutional perspective and
allocate the responsibility for corporate security transfers along lines of
constitutional jurisdiction. This article takes no position on the constitutional question. 83 It assumes, for the purposes of its analysis only, that
both provincial and federal governments may competently legislate in

82
83

Supra, n. 27.
At least one scholar has addressed this question directly and come to the conclusion that
most security transfer matters are within the constitutional jurisdiction of the provinces
with the exception of corporate securities that are bills or notes. Even with regard to such
corporate securities, this respected scholar advocates that the federal government should
voluntarily vacate the field for provincial legislation in the interests of greater efficiency
and harmony. Thus, even a constitutional analysis may ultimately have to importefficiencybased conciliations. See Geva, supra, n. 44.
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this area and then goes further in an attempt to discern which jurisdiction
may legislate in the most efficient manner.
Previous discussions of the role of the USTA in relation to corporate
statutes have tended to focus on a categorical analysis of the subject
matter. The classic argument is that security transfer rules are not properly categorized as corporate law since they do not relate to fundamental
corporate matters such as governance or protection of shareholder rights.
The USTA Consultation Paper argues that "[t]he settlement of a typical
market trade in corporate stock has almost nothing to do with corporate
law. It is fundamentally a matter of property law. " 84
While a categorical analysis has the allure of providing a definitive
characterization of the issue with attendant consequences, it may not be
quite so easy to pigeon-hole the issues. Corporate law can be regarded
as an amalgam of various different categories of law. For instance,
contract law can come into play as some have viewed the corporation
as a nexus of contracts with the articles of incorporation sometimes
being conceived metaphorically as a contract between ownership and
management. Tort-like concepts are also found in corporate statutes such
as the duty of care and fiduciary duties owed by directors to the corporation. 8 ~ Arguably, fundamental corporate matters such as enabling provisions relating to pre-emptive rights116 and options87 relate to property
rights. Rights attaching to shares are considered to be a fundamental
corporate law concept yet one of those rights usually includes the right
to receiving the remaining property of the corporation on dissolution 88
and may thus be conceived as also integrating property rights into the
concept.
Taken to an extreme, a radical deconstruction of corporate law
could potentially yield nothing but a handful of contract, tort, and property law concepts. While a categorical approach can yield some interesting observations, the critical juncture in the analysis would be where
to exactly draw the line between corporate law and property law where
USTA Consultation Paper, supra, n. 58 at 41. It also notes that, in the U.S., transfer rules
have always been considered a matter of commercial property-transfer law.
•s Section 122 of the CBCA mandates such duties and even goes so far as to say that such
duties cannot be contracted out of by the directors: CBCA, supra, n. I.
"" Ibid., s. 28.
1
• Ibid., s. 29.
88 Ibid., s. 24(3)(c).
84
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aspects of both may appear to be significantly present. Where the line
begins to become fuzzy, it is submitted that an efficiency analysis may
assist in providing guidance.
With respect to the CBCA Part VII provisions, several efficiency
matters may be considered:
• Nature of the indirect holding system: as outlined in Rev. UCC
Art. 8, the fundamental concept of the indirect holding system is
the security entitlement. In turn, an entitlement holder may only
generally assert its rights against its own security intermediary.
Clearly then, a great deal of risk and focus has been shifted
towards the use of a security intermediary. There are a number
of ways of mitigating against the risk of using a securities intermediary. For example, the Canadian Investor Protection Fund89
("CIPF') provides insurance (of up to $1 million) against investment dealer bankruptcy for customers of its member investment dealers. As the CIPF notes, investment dealer bankruptcy
is a relatively rare occurrence90 in part due to the regulatory
requirements imposed by provincial securities commissions.
The fact that many securities intermediaries (i.e., broker and
dealers) are regulated closely by the provincial securities administrators is highly significant. Since the indirect holding provisions direct the entitlement holder exclusively to the securities
intermediary with respect to its security entitlement rights, the
manner in which such securities intermediaries are regulated will
be of great interest to the entitlement holder. Despite the fact that
security intermediary regulation is not technically one of the
goals of securities transfer legislation, the interaction between to
two subjects is so great under the indirect holding regime that it
would be more efficient to have the two matters handled at the
same level of government.
A general principle of economic efficiency is that, all other things
being the same, responsibility should be delegated to lowest cost
monitor. In this case, it would be redundant and cost inefficient
19
90

See the Canadian Investor Protection Fund, online: <http://www.cipf.ca/C-..home.htm>.
Ibid. The CIPF notes that, since its inception in 1969, a total of$3S million has been paid
out to eligible customers of seventeen insolvent members.
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to have the federal government monitor the actions of securities
intermediaries when the same function is already being carried
out by provincial security regulators. While it is theoretically
possible to have the federal government legislate the indirect
holding system and leave the monitoring to the provincial securities commissions, this too would be inefficient since there
would be attendant information cost associated with the federal
and provincial governments coordinating with each other.
The more efficient solution would be to have the indirect holding
system governed by the entity that already governs the regulation
of security intermediaries. Currently, that would be the provincial
governments.

• Direct and indirect holding system should be together: Regardless of which jurisdiction governs the indirect holding system, both systems should be governed at the same level of government. Having two separate systems governed by different
levels of government would unnecessarily confuse matters by
requiring inquiry into two different statutes enacted by two different levels of government. If the direct and indirect holding
systems are consolidated into a single code, the result is a higher
degree of clarity and certainty.

• Securities consist of more than just corporate securities. If
the CBCA Part VII provisions were amended to reflect the direct
and indirect holding provisions of Rev. UCC Art. 8, there would
still be problems and a gap to fill. Presumably, such purported
CBCA amendments would only apply to corporate securities
since the CBCA could only deal with federal corporate matters.
It would not apply to provincial corporate securities. It would
almost certainly not apply to securities issued by non-corporate
entities such as limited partnerships and trusts. One need only
look to the Ontario Securities Act91 definition of "security" to
appreciate that the types of security traded on the market encompasses far more than just corporate shares or securities.
Therefore, even if the CBCA enacted provisions akin to Rev.
UCC Art. 8, it would still be necessary for the provinces or federal
•• Supra, n. 10.
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government to enact similar legislation to cover all securities
(i.e., not just federally incorporated corporate securities). This
would lead to an unnecessary and inefficient duplication of legislation. This would also generate additional information costs
since it would be necessary to coordinate both federal and provincial legislation so that federal corporate securities would be
treated in a similar manner as all other securities in the marketplace. If federal corporate securities were to be treated in a different manner than other securities, this could lead to uncertainty
and confusion as well as possible exploitation of differences in
the legislation. In light of this potential problem, the more costeffective solution would be to have the provincial legislatures
address the issue entirely since they necessarily have to address
the issues in any event at this time.

• Personal Property Security Laws: The USTA, Ontario STA,
and Alberta STA. in addition to addressing the transfer of securities, have provisions regarding the pledging of securities as
collateral. These provisions are intended to give greater certainty
to lenders when securities are pledged as collateral for an obligation. In tum, it is intended that such enhanced legal certainty
will promote the jurisdiction's competitiveness in the market and
attract capital.
Although it is beyond the scope of this article to detail the exact
mechanism by which such changes are accomplished, 92 it is important to note that personal property security laws have always
been the subject of provincial legislation.93 Therefore, the
changes required to allow personal property security law to more
effectively deal with book-based securities (i.e., in the indirect
02

One of the key problems was that it was unclear how one could obtain an enforceable
security interest in book-based securities. Lenders would often have to insist on a registration under the relevant personal property security statute and perhaps even require the
delivery of physical certificates. Such extended procedures would often be costly and
tedious. The USTA, Ontario STA, and Alberta STA handle this problem by creating the
concept of "control". "Control" is considered to be the functional equivalent of possession.
When a secured party has control over a security, its interest will take priority over other
parties that do not have control. Unlike the older and more narrow concept of''possession'',
the new concept of control is not limited to physical possession and can apply to book
based securities more easily.
93
For example, Ontario has the Personal Property Security Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. P.10 [Ontario
PPSA].
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holding system) will have to be implemented at the provincial
level.
For example, in the case of the Ontario STA there are changes
not only to OBCA transfer provisions (most of which have been
removed and placed wholly within the Ontario STA) but there
are also significant changes enacted to the Ontario PPSA (which
now allow for the aforementioned provisions relating to bookbased securities). There is greater integration between both the
Ontario STA and Ontario PPSA. Functionally this makes sense
because the transfer of securities (governed by Ontario STA) and
the pledging of securities as collateral (governed by Ontario
PPSA) are two very common occurrences that can often appear
in the same transaction. Having both transfers and pledges integrated in a legislative sense by the same level of government is
efficient.
On the other hand, if corporate securities transfers were governed
by the CBCA, then it would be necessary to review how such
transfer legislation would be integrated with provincial personal
property legislation. The additional information costs incurred
would then be multiplied since the federal legislation would have
to coordinate with not just one, but all of the provinces' personal
property legislation. Again, given the added information costs
and time consuming process offederal I provincial coordination,
it seems the more efficient solution is to allow the provinces to
handle the issue of security transfers entirely since they would
already have to coordinate it with their personal property legislation in any event.
• Harmonization with UCC model: If the goal is to harmonize
Canadian legislation with the UCC model, then in addition to
closely following substantive provisions (as the USTA has already done in both its proposed statute as well as its commentary), it would be wise to follow the general overall scheme as
well. In the UCC model, Rev. UCC Art. 8 is adopted by each
state as a separate piece of legislation, rather than integrating it
into a state corporate statute. In the mid-1970s, the direct holding
I negotiability concepts of the UCC model of the time were
integrated directly into the CBCA, presumably because, in part,
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there was no separate provincial statute within which to place
such provisions.

As has been noted before in this article, the CBCA amendments
of the mid-1970s were probably the best and most pragmatic
solution available at the time in light of those circumstances.
However, they did have the consequence of significantly departing from the UCC model that they were trying to follow.
While the UCC model contemplated a separate self-contained
piece oflegislation at the state (i.e., provincial) level, the amendments of the mid 1970s embedded the provisions within an existing corporate statute at the federal, rather than provincial, level.
In retrospect, the hazards of importing UCC Art. 8 provisions
without also implementing such provisions in the same general
overall schema become starkly apparent. Since CBCA Part VII
was enacted at the federal level, coordinating with all provincial
legislatures on closely related matters such as regulation of securities intermediaries and personal property security law would
become necessary sooner or later. Similarly, since CBCA Part
VII can only deal with corporate securities, there will necessarily
be a large void relating to all other types of securities that would
likely have to be filled by the provinces, thus requiring further
coordination between both levels of government.
As a final passing note, if one of the goals is confidence building
by adopting what some believe to be the most advanced securities
transfer system in the world (i.e., Rev. UCC Art. 8),94 then it
would be important to adopt not only its wording, but to also
implement it within the same general framework. Since the Rev.
UCC Art. 8 is implemented as a self-contained piece of legislation at the state level, in the interests of harmony, it would be
prudent to follow the same general structure. A provincial securities transfer statute such as the Ontario STA would best fulfill
such a role.
An efficiency-based analysis of CBCA Part VII results in the general conclusion that securities transfers are most rationally allocated to
provincial legislatures. The intensified focus on securities intermediaries
94

USTA Consultation Paper, supra, n. 58.
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in the indirect holding system brings renewed attention to the regulation
of such intennediaries. Regulation of security intermediaries is currently
accomplished at the provincial level so that it currently makes sense to
integrate it with the provinces. Similarly, closely related issues such as
personal property security law are regulated and legislated at the provincial level. If indirect holdings are to be regulated at the provincial
level, then efficiency dictates that direct holdings would be best regulated at the provincial level as well so as to result in a single comprehensive code of security transfer rather than an uncertain bifurcated one.
At best, CBCA Part VII would address only corporate securities and
leave all other securities to the provinces. Such a situation would result
in unnecessarily duplicative legislation. Finally, if the goal of harmonization is to be more accurately realized, then it is necessary to import
not only the wording of the UCC but also the general framework in
which it is implemented. All of these considerations generally suggest
that the most efficient allocation of responsibility is to the provinces.
From a historical perspective, it seems that the CBCA Part VII provisions
were intended to fill a void left due to the lack of relevant provincial
legislation at the time. Now that relevant and more efficient provincial
legislation is soon to be in place, it may be no longer necessary for the
CBCA to fill that void.

4. RECOMMENDATIONS ON FUTURE ACTION FOR CBCA
The foregoing analysis has come to the conclusion that it is more
efficient for CBCA to allocate responsibility for securities transfers to
provincial legislatures. In the analysis of how such a move might be
accomplished, certain factors may either facilitate or complicate the
allocation of securities transfer rules from the CBCA to provincial legislatures.

(a)

Factors Facilitating the Allocation to Provinces

The first factor facilitating the allocation provincial legislatures is
the ease of severance of the current provisions from the CBCA. As
discussed, the current CBCA Part VII provisions operate at two distinct
levels: administrative provisions and direct holding I negotiability provisions. The policy rationale behind the administrative provisions is
merely to provide support to the infrastructure that assists shareholders
in evidencing their ownership interest and exercising their rights. The
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policy rationale with respect to the direct holding I negotiability provisions is to enhance economic efficiency by legitimizing existing market
practices, thereby increasing certainty.
The differing policy rationales behind these provisions suggest that
they address different goals and are thus easily severable from each other
since they do not depend on each other. Indeed, prior to the amendments
in the mid- l 970s, the Canadian federal corporate law statutes did in fact
exist without the provisions to be severed. Removing the direct holding
I negotiability provisions will not be the removal of inextricably intertwined provisions in the CBCA. The transfer provisions of the CBCA
comprise a fairly self-contained code that exists to promote market
efficiencies, a rationale that is quite far removed from the more standard
corporate rationales in the rest of the statute. In essence, removing the
present direct holding provisions from the CBCA merely reverses the
amendments of the mid-l 970s. These amendments have since been
superseded by potentially more modem mechanisms of promoting efficient market trades. As was analyzed earlier in this article, the relatively
small amount of case law surrounding these provisions suggests that
they are not the subject of high volume litigation. This further affirms
the notion that their removal will not necessarily have a huge negative
impact on the actual market. 9'

The second factor facilitating the allocation of responsibility to the
provinces is the fact that the indirect holding system, including its coexistence with the direct holding system, is nothing new. The indirect
holding system and book-based securities are a commercial reality and
have been so for quite some time now. In addition, the current provincial
securities transfer legislation are all based on the USTA, which in tum
is based on Rev. UCC Art. 8. Rev. UCC Art. 8 has been in place since
the mid- l 990s and was specifically drafted to handle the issue of indirect
holdings. The prevalence of indirect holding as an established commercial practice along with a proven, reputable system of legislation should
provide the federal government with a strong degree of comfort that the
transfer of corporate securities will be handled well by the new provincial
legislation.
"' However, it is worth remembering that the new direct holding provisions under the Ontario
STA uses the term "protected purchaser" as opposed to "bona fide purchaser". Thus, the
new statutory provisions potentially render the previously decided case law obsolete.
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Third, based on the dominance of the indirect holding system and
the comments of the securities industry, it is clear that there is high
demand for legislation relating to the transfer of book-based securities.
This is highly significant given how the USTA is essentially an attempt
to transplant U.S. law into Canada. Some scholarly studies suggest that
the effectiveness of a legal transplant is strongly determined by whether
or not the recipient jurisdiction is familiar and receptive to the imported
legal concepts:
Our key argument is that legality is largely a function of the demand for law.
Only if demand for law is high, will there be voluntary compliance and will a
society invest in the legal institutions necessary for upholding the public legal
order[ ... ] Laws that are compatible with the preexisting social norms are more
likely to be well received and thus effectuated. We therefore suggest that transplants may work, if they are adapted, or if the population is already well familiar
with the basic principles of these laws. 96

Since the Canadian market is already quite familiar with the indirect
holding system (which is the basis of the vast volume of its publicly
traded securities) and demand for legislation is fairly high, the above
scholarly study suggests that transplantation of Rev. UCC Art. 8 to the
Canadian legal system is likely to have a high probability of success.

(b)

Factors Complicating the Allocation to Provinces

It is clear enough that CBCA Part VII provisions addressing the
administrative infrastructure (e.g., providing for a shareholder register,
etc.) should be left in the CBCA because such provisions do not relate
to the issues of securities transfer (i.e., direct and indirect holdings). The
question is what one must do to address the potential conflict between
direct holding systems and whether one addresses the lack of any indirect
holding provisions at the federal level.
The single most important factor that complicates the allocation of
securities transfer responsibility is the fact that the provinces and territories have not all implemented or enacted securities transfer legislation.
This inconsistency among provinces and territories places the CBCA
Part VII provisions in a fairly difficult position at the moment. If the
CBCA were to remove its direct holding provisions and allow the Ontario STA and Alberta STA to handle the issue, a gap would exist for
""D. Berkowitz, K. Pistor & Jean-Francois Richard, ''The Transplant Effect" (2003) 51 Am.
J. Comp. L. 163 at 189.
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the provinces and territories that have no securities transfer legislation.
In other words, the provinces and territories that have no version of the
USTA enacted would now also have no direct holding provisions with
respect to federal business corporations because the CBCA would have
repealed them.
On the other hand, if the CBCA does not remove its current direct
holding provisions, then there is the possibility of duplicative and conflicting laws with the Ontario STA and Alberta STA, since these provinces deal with direct holding as well within their securities transfer
legislation. In short, there would be two sets of direct holding provisions,
one federal and one provincial.

(c) Options and Recommendations
The next part of this article will discuss the various options for
allocating securities transfer responsibility in light of the complications
mentioned above. It is assumed that the administrative provisions of
CBCA Part VII will remain in the CBCA as these provisions properly
support CBCA policy rationales. The options below relate to possible
courses of action regarding direct and indirect holding issues. The possible options include the following:

• Option 1: Enact a federal STA, with provincial exemptions
if equivalent in place. In this scenario, the federal government
would enact a federal version of the USTA. This would ensure
that the provinces that had not yet enacted securities transfer
legislation would at least have a comprehensive code for both
indirect and direct holding of federal corporate securities (though
there would still be no legislation dealing with non-federal corporate securities in the province). The federal STA could also
state that if the province had a substantially similar piece of
securities transfer legislation in place, then the provincial legislation would prevail. Eventually, if all the provinces and territories harmonized their legislation to the USTA, the federal STA
provisions would be moot and could be repealed altogether.
This general stratagem of using federal law to cover provincial
gaps and generally receding in favour of provinces is not an
entirely unfamiliar concept. The recently enacted federal privacy
legislation, Personal Information Privacy and Electronic Doc-
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uments Act91 ("PIPEDA"), makes use of a similar, though not
exactly same, concept. PIPEDA has a number of important provisions that protect the privacy of individuals.
However, PIPEDA also states that the Governor in Council, may,
"if satisfied that legislation of a province that is substantially
similar to this Part applies to an organization, a class of organizations, an activity or a class of activities, exempt the organization, activity or class from the application of this Part in respect
of the collection, use or disclosure of personal information that
occurs within that province. ''98 In short, if the federal government
is satisfied that the province has privacy legislation that is substantially similar to that of PIPEDA, then it may exempt the
province from a substantive number of PIPEDA's provisions.
To date, this provision has already been invoked by the federal
government. The general privacy legislation of both Alberta and
British Columbia has already been deemed by the federal government to be "substantially similar". 99 The main difference between PIPEDA and the option of a federal STA is that PIPEDA
does not contemplate completely vacating the privacy area while
the federal STA may actually welcome such an action, if part of
the rationale to implement it is to fill the gap left by provinces
without securities transfer legislation.
The disadvantage to this option is that it requires extensive legislation by the federal government. The CBCA Part VII provisions would have to be removed and the federal STA would have
to been enacted. One comfort is that the federal STA would
already have the pre-existing model of the USTA to draw upon
and it is unlikely that any substantial deviations would be required. However, unlike the provincial securities transfer legislation, the federal STA would have the added complexity of
drafting and implementing the transition and exemption clauses
mentioned above.
97
Personal Information Privacy and Electronic Documents Act, S.C. 2000, c. 5 [PIPED A].
•• Ibid., s. 26(2)(b).
99
See the Canadian Privacy Commissioner, online: <http://www.privcom.gc.ca/legislation/
ss...Jndex_e.asp> citing the relevant issues of the Canada Gazette where the proclamations
were made.
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The advantage to this option is that it provides maximum cov·
erage of direct and indirect holdings for corporate securities of
CBCA companies as well as securities of other business organ·
izations. It could be fairly said that this reasonably represents the
most the federal government could do in the face of incomplete
provincial harmonization. There have been many proposals for
a single securities regulator with a single securities act for the
entire country. (For the most recent discussion, see the Wise
Persons Committee Report 2003). 100 If this were to occur then
one could contemplate a larger merger and coordination of all
provincial STAs and the federal STA enacted under this option.
Ideally, this would result in efficient synergies between both
level of governments.

• Option 2: Leave CBCA Part VII with provincial exemption
if equivalent in place. This scenario envisages that the current
direct holding provisions of the CBCA Part VII will continue to
govern unless the province has addressed direct holdings, in a
manner similar to the USTA, in its own provincial securities
transfer legislation. This option solves the problem of having
conflicting direct holding provisions between the CBCA and the
Ontario I Alberta STAs. However, if a province has not enacted
any securities transfer legislation, then there will be no gap for
federal corporate securities since the CBCA Part VII provisions
will continue to exist for those provinces.
The disadvantage to this option is that it provides no solution for
the indirect holdings of federal corporate securities in provinces
that have not enacted any securities legislation. Arguably, this
does not deviate from the status quo since, until the Ontario and
Alberta STAs are in force, there currently is no regime for indi·
reel holding securities in any province.
The advantage to this option is that it requires minimal legislative
action. The provisions of the CBCA are neither being removed
nor is another separate piece of legislation being drafted. The
current CBCA would simply make the qualifications mentioned
above. Furthermore, one might argue that this option is very non·
100

Committee to Review the Structure of Securities Regulation in Canada, It's Time (Ottawa:
Department of Finance, 2003).
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interventionalist since it does not attempt to impose a federal
STA upon a province.

• Option 3: Wait for provincial harmonization. This scenario
contemplates that the federal government do nothing until such
time that all of the provinces have implemented securities transfer legislation similar to the UST A. At that point, the federal
government would be in a position to completely repeal the
CBCA Part VII transfer provisions. The advantage to this option
is that there are no gaps in legislation. The main disadvantage is
that it may be overly optimistic. If one assumes that the provinces
will harmonize very quickly then this option is likely best. However, complete provincial harmonization of legislation would be
an unprecedented occurrence in Canadian legal history. Thus,
apprehension over whether this would likely occur in the short
term may be well founded. If provincial harmonization is not
forthcoming, then there is again the problem of duplication and
potential conflict between the legislation of provinces that have
enacted securities transfer legislation and the direct holding provisions of the CBCA.
• Option 4: Completely repeal the CBCA transfer provisions
without reference to provinces. This scenario envisages the
federal completely vacating the field of securities transfer for the
provincial legislatures. Ostensibly, this would simply bring the
CBCA, with respect to securities transfers, to its pre mid- l 970s
state. There are several significant disadvantages to this approach. First, it is unclear what effect the repeal would have on
federal corporate securities certificates already in existence. Issues of retroactivity would have to be addressed. Second, it
would leave a complete legal vacuum with respect to direct
holdings of federal corporate securities in provinces that have
not enacted any securities transfer legislation. This could lead to
uncertainty and work against the very economic efficiencies that
prompted the federal government to move in this direction in the
first place.
The advantage of this option is that it is relatively easy to implement since it only requires repeal of the current CBCA Part VII
transfer provisions. However, if the issue of retroactivity and
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other ancillary issues are addressed in the CBCA amendments,
then even this advantage could quiclcly evaporate. Arguably, the
creation of a legal vacuum may prompt and provide incentive to
provincial legislatures to enact securities transfer legislation.
However, this is a risky strategy particularly for provinces where
trade in securities is not a priority and may, in fact, backfire.
It is suggested that the optimal choices are options 1 and 2 above.
The approach of waiting for complete provincial harmonization (option
3) may be far too optimistic and would leave potentially conflicting
legislation in place. Completely repealing all of the CBCA Part VD
transfer provisions (option 4), without regard to the provinces, may be
simply too drastic a step given the confusion that it can generate.
Enacting a federal STA with provincial exemptions (option 1) is
arguably the most complete and comprehensive solution. It ensures that
there is no conflict with the Ontario STA and the Alberta STA while
providing a complete code of securities transfer (direct and indirect) for
provinces that have no securities transfer legislation. Whether or not it
is ultimately chosen will depend heavily upon the federal government's
willingness to legislate a comprehensive securities transfer statute with
intricate provincial exemption provisions.
On the other hand, leaving the direct holding provisions of CBCA
Part VIl in place with provincial exemption (option 2) is an easier and
less intrusive than option l, though less comprehensive. This option
requires only minimal legislative action in the form of drafting a provincial exemption for CBCA Part VD. It is also the most flexible of all
the options since it easily allows the federal government the freedom to
pursue other options in the future. Whether or not this option is chosen
will depend on the federal government's willingness to tolerate an incomplete though flexible measure.

5. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
The current provisions of Part VD of the CBCA have an interesting
history. Their enactment in the mid- l 970s was a response to the market
practice of treating corporate security certificates as negotiable instruments. These provisions were heavily based on UCC Art. 8, though they
differed slightly in wording. CBCA Part VD has a comprehensive set of
provisions regarding the negotiability of federal corporate securities with
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integrated concepts such as "bona fide purchaser". A review of the case
law reveals that there have not been many significant judicial considerations of these provisions (both at the federal level and of analogous
Ontario corporate statute provisions).
CBCA Part VII operates at two policy rationale levels. At one level,
CBCA Part VII contains provisions that are administrative and supportive in nature. These provisions provide the infrastructure that assists
shareholders in exercising their rights. At another level, CBCA Part VII
has negotiability provisions that, in the mid- l 970s, supported existing
market practices, harmonized with important trading partners and helped
move the law towards a comprehensive code for securities transfer.
Although CBCA Part VII may have been a pragmatic solution at
the time of its enactment, it has not kept up with modem times. CBCA
Part VII only deals with the direct holding system. Currently, the dominant market practice for the transfer of securities is the indirect holding
system. The indirect holding system is far more efficient since it deals
with book-based entries rather than the more tedious practice of delivering physical security certificates. The indirect holding system is, by
far, the manner in which the vast majority of publicly traded shares are
held in Canada (as well as the U.S.).
The U.S. has addressed the dominant practice of indirect holding
in Rev. UCC Art. 8. Until recently, no Canadian legislation addressed
indirect holding. However, the CSA drafted the UST A in an attempt to
address the indirect holding system and to modernize the Canadian
system. Both Ontario and Alberta have enacted virtually identical securities transfer legislation (which have received royal assent but are not
yet in force) based upon the UST A. The Ontario STA removes the direct
holding provisions in the OBCA (analogous to CBCA Part VII) and
places them within the STA. The direct holding provisions are similar
but the concept of bona fide purchaser is replaced with the concept of
protected purchaser (which arguably provides more protection to the
transferee). With respect to indirect holdings, the Ontario STA creates
a regime whereby indirect holdings are recognized as a security entitlement against a security intermediary. Security transfers are conducted
by the creation of a security entitlement on one security intermediary's
books and the elimination of a security entitlement on another security
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intermediary's books. An entitlement holder, generally speaking, can
only assert its security rights against its own intermediary.
Although the administrative provisions of CBCA Part VII fulfill
the corporate policy rationale of supporting shareholder rights (by assisting in the creation of an evidentiary scheme), the negotiability provisions do not seem to fulfill any of the traditional goals of corporate
law. In a broad abstract sense, the negotiability provisions arguably
promoted the corporate goal of economic efficiency back in the mid1970s by legitimating a common market practice. However, if that was
the case, then that rationale is no longer present since CBCA Part VII
has not kept up with the dominant indirect holding system.
The goals of the Ontario I Alberta STAs may seem to be complementary to those of the CBCA. Both the Ontario I Albert STAs have the
goal of harmonizing with the U.S. as well as controlling systemic and
legal risk. This would be consistent with the efficiency goals of the
CBCA. However, there is the potential for conflict. The CBCA has
direct holding provisions and the Ontario STA also has direct holding
provisions (which purport to apply to all securities). Since the Ontario
STA has introduced new concepts such as "protected purchaser" to its
legislation, this has the potential of conflicting with older traditional
concepts in CBCA Part VII.
In assessing the future role of CBCA Part VII, there are many
perspectives one could take. Rather than using a constitutional or categorical analysis, this article proceeds with an efficiency analysis. It
concludes that the CBCA ought to allow the provinces to legislate in
relation to both direct and indirect holdings of securities. Indirect holding
schemes based on Rev. UCC Art. 8 emphasiz.e that the entitlement holder
may only assert rights against the security intermediary. As a result, the
jurisdiction that regulates security intermediaries is the most efficient
one to handle the related issue of indirect holdings. Presently, that would
be the provincial governments. Similarly, the issue of pledging securities
as collateral is handled by the provincial government. Since security
transfers and pledges are closely related issues, again it would be more
efficient to have a single level of government deal with them together.
On the other hand, current CBCA Part VII provisions that deal only with
the administrative issues and not with direct I indirect holding issues
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should be left in the CBCA as these provisions properly provide the
infrastructure for corporate law matters.
Moreover, securities consist of more than just corporate securities
of federally incorporated companies. They consist of provincial corporate securities as well as non-corporate securities. Thus, any federal
attempt to legislate regarding indirect holdings would necessarily be
incomplete because presumably a hypothetical CBCA indirect holding
scheme would only apply to federal corporate securities. This would
necessitate that the provinces legislate a parallel statute dealing with all
other types of securities. This would lead to confusing and unnecessarily
duplicative legislation. Finally, if the goal is harmonization with the
UCC model, then it would be advisable to follow not only the same
wording but also the same framework. The UCC contemplated a separate
and self-contained securities transfer code enacted at the state level.
Instead, Canada enacted it at the federal level and integrated it within
its corporate statute. In time, this departure from the original framework
would become apparent as integration with the provinces on key issues
and dealing with non-corporate security issues became more difficult.
Presently, allocating responsibility for securities transfer to the
provinces is difficult because not all of the provinces have enacted
securities transfer legislation. If the CBCA removes its direct holding
provisions, then there may be a gap for provinces without securities
transfer legislation. On the other hand, if the CBCA leaves its direct
holding provisions as is, then there may be potential conflict with provinces that have enacted securities transfer legislation.
There are four suggested options:
• enact a federal STA (based on USTA) with provincial exemptions for provinces with functional equivalent of federal STA;
• leave CBCA Part VII direct holding with provincial exemptions
for provinces with direct holding provisions similar to UST A;
• do nothing and wait until all provinces harmonize; or
• remove all CBCA Part VII direct holding provisions.
The latter two options are not very appealing. Waiting for the
provinces to harmonize may be too optimistic and can result in conflicting legislation in the interim. Removing all CBCA Part VII direct holding provisions may be too drastic and could lead to uncertainty. The two
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former options are optimal. Enacting a federal STA is the most comprehensive solution with no gaps though it requires the willingness to
commit to a detailed legislative solution. Leaving the CBCA direct
holding provisions with a provincial exemption is the least committal
solution and has the advantage of being flexible and leaving choices to
the provinces. It is easier to implement and requires the willingness to
tolerate an incomplete solution in exchange for future flexibility. In
either event, both these options at least address the situation in balanced
manner founded on what is relatively speaking, an efficient approach.
POSTSCRIPT

Since this article was written, both the Securities Act (Ontario) and
Securities Act (Alberta) have been enacted and are now in force.

